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This paper considers social welfare maximization for spatial resource sharing networks (SRSNs), in which multiple autonomous 
users are spatially located and mutual influence only occurs between nearby users. To cope with a lack of central control and the 
restriction that only local information is available, a spatial resource sharing game is proposed. However, individual selfishness in 
traditional game models generally leads to inefficiency and dilemmas. Inspired by local cooperative behavior in biological sys-
tems, a community cooperation mechanism (CCM) is proposed to improve the efficiency of the game. Specifically, when a user 
makes a decision, it maximizes the aggregate payoffs for its local community rather than selfishly consider itself. It is analytically 
shown that with the bio-inspired CCM, the social optimum of SRSNs is achieved with an exchange of local information. The 
proposed bio-inspired CCM is very general and can be applied to various communication networks. 
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Distributed decision-making in wireless communication 
systems is a research topic that is currently attracting a lot 
of attention, e.g., distributed power control [1], multiple 
access control [2], and distributed channel selection [3]. 
While most existing work is limited to one-hop networks, in 
which the decision of one user influences all other users, 
this is not always true in practice. Thus, a more practical 
network model, in which the users are spatially located and 
mutual influence only emerges between neighboring users, 
has recently begun to draw attention. The most representa-
tive work is graphical game formulation for distributed 
channel selection in cognitive radio networks [4] and spatial 
congestion game formulation for spectrum sharing [5]. In 
this paper we will call this kind of network spatial resource 
sharing networks (SRSNs). Notably, SRSNs are character-
ized by the following features: (i) lack of central control, (ii) 
the availability of local information rather than global in-
formation, and (iii) mutual influence only emerges between 
neighboring users. Although SRSNs fit practical systems 
well, such networks are still in their infancy. Most importantly, 
the lack of central control and the restrictive availability of 
only local information create the challenging task of ob-
taining social optimum [6]—a problem that has not yet been 
considered in previous literature. 
The most promising solution to cope with this lack of 
central control appears to be game theory [7]. Game theory 
is a powerful tool used to analyze interactions among multi-
ple autonomous users, and it has been widely applied to 
wireless communication systems. However, players in games 
are generally assumed to be selfish; as a result, the outcome 
of the game, e.g., Nash equilibrium (NE), is generally ineffi-
cient. This is referred to as the tragedy of commons [8] and is 
the inherent limitation of game models with respect to their 
applications in wireless communication systems. Thus, recent 
literature includes several approaches to improve the effi-
ciency of game models, and current methods include using a 
coordinate game [9], pricing [10], and bargaining [11]. 
However, these methods require global information regarding 
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all other players in terms of actions and payoffs after each 
play. Therefore, existing methods cannot be applied to 
SRSNs and we need to seek for a new method that can 
achieve a social optimum for SRSNs using local information. 
Bio-inspired approaches have been proposed to charac-
terize the dynamics of multi-user interactions among com-
munication devices, e.g., human behavior-inspired design 
for cognitive radio networks [12], evolution algorithms for 
spectrum allocation [13], and bio-inspired learning tech-
nologies for random access networks [14,15]. It has been 
shown that bio-inspired solutions achieve desirable out-
comes and provide meaningful explanations from a biolog-
ical perspective. 
In this paper, motivated by the local cooperative behavior 
in biological systems, we propose a community cooperation 
mechanism (CCM) to achieve social optimums for SRSNs. 
The key idea of the bio-inspired CCM is that when a user 
makes a decision, it maximizes the aggregate payoffs for its 
local community rather than selfishly consider itself. It is 
analytically shown that with the proposed bio-inspired 
CCM, social optimums for SRSNs are achieved with local 
information exchanges. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first investigation on achieving social optimums for 
SRSNs with local information. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
section 1, a general description of spatial resource sharing 
networks (SRSNs) is presented. In section 2, the bio-inspired 
community cooperation mechanism (CCM) is proposed and 
its optimality is validated. In section 3, an example in wire-
less ad hoc networks is studied to show the optimality of 
bio-inspired CCM. Finally, we present a discussion and 
future work in section 4, with our conclusions in section 5. 
1  Spatial resource sharing networks 
In spatial resource sharing networks (SRSNs), there are N 
users autonomously competing for M resources. The user 
set is denoted as  ={1,...,N} and the resource set as 
1{ , , }  Me e . Moreover, we are given an undirected 
graph G=(V, E), where V is the vertex set and E is the edge 
set. Each vertex on G corresponds to an autonomous user. If 
two users, say i and j, are connected by an edge, i.e., (i, j)E, 
it means that they can exchange information directly and 
their decisions affect each other. The connection topology is 
completely arbitrary (i.e., it may include loops and cycles). 
Furthermore, each user has information regarding only its 
local connection topology. Jn denotes the set of connected 
users of user n, i.e., 
  : ( , ) .  nJ m n m E  (1) 
It is assumed that each user only chooses exactly one ac-
tion at a time. n   denotes the available action set of 
user n, where   is the resource set; in addition, n na   
denotes an action of user n. Furthermore, the set of the ac-
tion profiles of all the users is given by kk    , 
where   represents the Cartesian product. Moreover, 
 n na   denotes an action profile of all the users except 
user n, where \n k kk     ; similarly, n nJ Ja   de-
notes an action profile of the connected users of user n, 
where 
n nJ k J k   . 
In SRSNs, the payoff for a user is determined by its se-
lected resource as well as the action profile of the connected 
users. Suppose that user n chooses action n na  , then it 
receives the following payoff: 
    , , , ,
n n n nna n J n na n J
R a a f r a a  (2) 
where fn() is the spatial resource sharing function, and rnan is 
the perceived state of resource an by user n. Note that the 
form of the spatial resource sharing function needs not be 
identical for the users; instead, it can be user-dependent. 
Definition 1 Social welfare:  social welfare for a SRSN 
is defined as the aggregate payoffs of all the users, i.e., 
 . nn naS R  (3) 
Definition 2 Social optimum: we term action profile 
opt opt opt
1{ , , }Na a a   as one that has reached its social opti-
mum if it maximizes the social welfare, i.e., 







We highlight the following distinctive features of the 
considered SRSNs: 
(1) Heterogeneous available action set, i.e., the available 
action set can vary from user to user. 
(2) Heterogeneous perceived resource state, i.e., different 
users may perceive different states of the same resource. 
(3) User-dependent resource sharing function, i.e., the re-
ceived payoff is not only associated with the selected resource 
and the action profile, but also dependent on the user type. 
Then, the network-centric goal is to obtain its social op-
timum. However, solving such a combinatorial optimization 
problem is NP-hard even in a centralized manner with glob-
al information [6]. Thus, the lack of central control and the 
restrictive availability of only local information will make 
the task of obtaining social optimum challenging. Therefore, 
we seek for a distributed approach with lower complexity in 
the following. 
2  Bio-inspired community cooperation mechanism 
2.1  Motivation 
A lack of central control motivates us to address the resource 
sharing problem of SRSNs via the formulation of a game, 
denoted by ( , , )  n nG u , where the graph G specifies 
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the player (user) set and the mutual influence among users, 
n  is the available action set of player n, and un is the util-
ity function of user n. The goal of each player in the game is 
to maximize its individual utility. Thus, the spatial resource 
sharing game is expressed as follows: 
  : max , , .   nn n n n Ja u a a n   (5) 
Although the above game formulation accurately de-
scribes the interactions among users, individual selfishness 
generally leads to inefficiency and dilemmas [7]. Thus, im-
proving the efficiency of the game is a key concern. How-
ever, because of the lack of central control and the restric-
tive availability of only local information, achieving social 
optimums for SRSNs is a challenging task. 
We then look to bio-inspired mechanisms to solve this 
problem. Specifically, we resort to local cooperation, which 
is ubiquitous in nature, ranging from single cell [16] to 
groups of animals [17]. In addition, it is the foundation of 
human society [18]. Individuals in biological systems are 
willing to help others to whom they are connected [17], 
rather than behave selfishly. Inspired by this idea, we pro-
pose a bio-inspired community cooperation mechanism 
(CCM), with which each player helps all players in its local 
community. First, let us define the local community that is 
central to the bio-inspired CCM. 
Definition 3 Local community:  local community Cn of 
user n is a set of users, which consists of itself and all of its 
connected users, i.e., { } n nC n J . 
Here, an example is shown in Figure 1. The local com-
munities of users 2 and 3 are given by C2={1,2,4,7} and 
C3={1,3,4}, respectively. Note that the different local 
communities of different users may partially overlap. 
It can be seen that the local community is a collection of 
users that can exchange information directly—cooperation 
among the users in a local community is feasible. Thus, we 
relax individual selfishness in game models and consider  
 
Figure 1  Illustration of local communities in SRSNs. 
user cooperation in a local community. This motivates us to 
define the utility function as follows: 
 ,
 
   k n
n n
in ka na ia
k C i J
u R R R  (6) 
where Jn is the connected user set of user n specified by eq. 
(1) and Rnan is the individually received payoff of user n 
specified by eq. (2). Note that the above-defined utility 
function is the aggregate payoffs of the local community Cn. 
In other words, when a user makes a decision, it considers 
its local community rather than selfishly considers itself. 
2.2  Analysis of NE 
Here we define the Nash equilibrium (NE), which is the 
steady outcome of non-cooperative game models, and then 
investigate its properties.  
Definition 4 Nash equilibrium:  action profile a*= 
(a1
*,...,aN
*) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) of  if, 
and only if, no player can improve its utility by deviating 
unilaterally, i.e., 
   * * * *, , , , , .     
n nn n J n n J n n n n
u a a u a a n a a a    (7) 
Instinctively, the proposed bio-inspired CCM would 
perform well, because each user helps all the members in its 
local community. The theoretical results are as follows. 
Theorem 1.   is an exact potential game that has at 
least one pure strategy NE, and the social optimum consti-
tutes a pure strategy NE of . 
Proof: We construct the potential function as follows:  
    , = , ,  n n na n Jn n na a R a a  (8) 
where nanR  is the payoff for user n specified by eq.(2). 
Note that the defined potential function is exactly equal to 
social welfare S. Therefore, we have:  







That is, social optimum coincides with the global maxi-
mum of the potential function. 
Suppose that an arbitrary player n unilaterally changes its 
channel selection from an to na , the change in its individu-
al utility function caused by this unilateral change is then 
given by:  
       , , = , , n n J n n J n n J n n Jn n n nu a a u a a R a a R a a  
       , ,

  
 ，k k J k k Jk k
k Jn
R a a R a a  (10) 
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where Jka represents the channel selection profile of the 
connected users set of user k, after the unilateral change of 
user n. 
At the same time, the change in the potential function 
caused by this unilateral change is given by:  
 
   
   
    















n n n n
na n J na n Jn n n n
ka k J ka k Jk k k k
k Jn
ka k J ka k Jk k k k
k Cn
a a a a
R a a R a a
R a a R a a




where ( , )ka k Jk kR a a  denotes the achievable payoff for 
player k after unilaterally changing the selection of player n, 
and A\B means that set B is excluded from set A. As player 
n’s action only affects the payoffs of the users in its local 
community, then the following equation holds:  
      , , = 0, \ .  ka k J ka k J nk k k kR a a R a a k C  (12) 
Based on eqs. (10)–(12), we have the following equation:  
        , , = , , .   n n n n n n J n n Jn na a a a u a a u a a  (13) 
That is, the change in individual utility function caused 
by any player’s unilateral deviation is the same as the 
change in the potential function. Thus, according to the 
definition given in [16], it is known that  is an exact poten-
tial game with the social welfare S serving as the potenial 
function. 
Exact potential game is a unique type of potential game, 
and exhibits several attractive properties; the two most im-
portant properties are as follows: 
(1) Every potential game has at least one pure strategy NE.  
(2) Any global or local maxima of the potential function 
constitutes a pure strategy NE.  
Thus, according to eq. (9), Theorem 1 is proved.  
Theorem 1 states that the optimal NE of the spatial re-
source sharing game coincides with social optimum. How-
ever, multiple NE points normally exist in  and some of 
them may be suboptimal [7]. Thus, we require a learning 
algorithm to achieve optimal NE. 
2.3  Achieving social optimum with local information 
There are large number of learning algorithms capable of 
achieving pure strategy NE of potential games, e.g., best 
response dynamic [19], no-regret learning [3,20] and ficti-
tious play [21]. However, a main drawback of the above 
learning algorithms is that there is no guarantee that they 
will converge to the optimal NE. Namely, they may con-
verge instead to some sub-optimal NE points. 
It has been shown that there is a learning algorithm, spa-
tial adaptive play (SAP) [22], which converges to a pure NE 
of a potential game that maximizes the potential function 
with an arbitrary higher probability. To characterize SAP, 
we extend  to a mixed strategy form. The mixed strategy 
for player n at iteration k is denoted by probability distribu-
tion ( ) ( )n nq k  , where ( ) n denotes the set of probability 
distributions over action set n . In SAP, only one player is 
randomly selected to update its action according to the 
mixed strategy, while all other players repeat their actions. 
This process is repeated until the stop criterion, e.g., the 
maximum number of iteration is achieved, is met. Formally, 
the SAP procedure can be described as follows. 
Spatial adaptive play (SAP): Initially, each user n   
randomly selects an action an(0) from its available action set 
n  with equal probability. In iteration k, just one player, 
say i, is randomly selected. Then, it chooses an action 
ai(k+1) i according to the mixed strategy qi(k+1) ( ) i , 
where the ai th component ( 1)aiiq k  of the mixed strategy 
is given by:  





i i Ja ii
i
i i Ja ii
u a a k
q k
u a a k


    (14) 
for some learning parameter  > 0. In the meantime, all the 
other players repeat their actions, i.e., ( 1) = ( ) i ia k a k . 
This process is repeated until the stop criterion is met. An 
illustration of the bio-inspired CCM using SAP is shown in 
Figure 2. It is noted that calculating the mixed strategy 
( 1)iaiq k  only requires local information of users in its 
local community. 
Proposition 1.  In a repeated potential game in which all 
players adhere to SAP, the unique stationary distribution 
( ) ( ) a   of the action profiles, > 0 , is given as  
 
Figure 2  Illustration of the bio-inspired CCM using SAP. 
 Xu Y H, et al.   Chin Sci Bull   January (2012) Vol.57 No.1 129 








    (15) 
where  () is the potential function.  
Proof: Similar lines given in [9,22] can be applied to 
prove this proposition.  
Theorem 2.  With a sufficiently large , the bio-inspired 
CCM converges to the social optimum with an arbitrary 
high probability.  
Proof:  According to eq. (9), the global maximum value 
of the potential function can be obtained by max opt= ( )a  . 
Thus, set    , which yields the following:  
      opt optexp exp , \ .a a a A a     (16) 
Based on eqs. (15) and (16), the following can be obtained:  
  opt = 1.lim a   (17) 
Hence, Theorem 2 is proved.  
According to Theorems 1 and 2, social optimum is 
achieved solely via a local information exchange. Specifi-
cally, as stated in Theorem 1, social optimum constitutes a 
NE point of the game by using the bio-inspired CCM. Thus, 
as stated in Theorem 2, social optimum, i.e., the optimal NE, 
is achieved distributively by using SAP. To summarize, a 
bio-inspired CCM is desirable for SRSNs because social 
optimum is reached as a result of the interactions of indi-
vidual decisions. From a biological perspective, this result is 
straightforward and elegant. 
When SRSNs shrink into one-hop systems, e.g., a wire-
less mesh network [9], in which each user is connected to 
all other users, the proposed CCM is reduced to a global 
cooperative mechanism. In this case, social optimum also 
occurs as a result of individual decisions. For a detailed 
description of global cooperative mechanisms, refer to [9]. 
2.4  Algorithm discussion 
In this subsection, we discuss some key concerns with re-
gard to the application of SAP in practice. 
First, there are several approaches noted in previous lit-
erature regarding the implementation of a random selection 
of users in distributed networks. For instance, random token 
passing as discussed in [9], and 802.11 DCF-based negotia-
tion mechanism proposed in [20]. 
Second, the learning parameter  balances the trade-off 
between exploration and exploitation. Specifically, accord-
ing to the updating rule specified by (14), smaller  means 
that the user is more likely to select a sub-optimal action, 
while a larger  means that it is more likely to select a better 
action. In particular, = 0 means that user i will select any 
action ai(k+1) iA  with equal probability, while     
means that it will select the best action. Therefore, it is ad-
visable that during the beginning phase, the value of  is set 
to a small number, and that it increases as the learning algo-
rithm iterates [9]. 
Third, it should be pointed out that the arbitrary high 
probability in Theorem 2 means that the probability is suffi-
ciently close to 1. For example, suppose that there are mul-
tiple NE points in a SRSN, which lead to the following so-
cial welfare, S={1.2,1.1,1.1,1}. Pc denotes the probability 
that the bio-inspired CCM converges to the maximum social 
welfare, i.e., Smax=max{S}=1.2. Then, according to Proposi-
tion 1, it is known that Pc=0.9643 for  = 40. Furthermore, 
when the value of  increases, Pc increases accordingly and 
is sufficiently close to 1, e.g., Pc=0.9950 for  = 60 and 
Pc=19×105 for  = 100. 
3  Example of distributed channel selection in 
wireless ad hoc networks 
The problem of distributed channel selection in a wireless 
ad hoc network can be formulated as a SRSN. In such a 
network, the available channels represent the resource set, 
the perceived state of a resource corresponds to the instan-
taneous channel characteristics, e.g., signal-to-noise ratio 
(SNR), and the spatial resource sharing function can be de-
rived from the used transmission mechanisms, e.g., slotted 
or non-slotted Aloha, various versions of carrier sensing 
multiple access (CSMA), or time division multiple access 
(TDMA). 
In the simulation study we consider the perfect CSMA 
transmission mechanism. The deployment of the simulated 
SRSN is shown in Figure 3, where each circle represents a 
transmitter–receiver pair and the dashed lines represent the 
influences among the pairs. Each transmitter–receiver pair 
is interchangeably referred to as a user. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that there are three homogeneous channels with a  
 
Figure 3  Deployment of the simulated SRSN (each circle represents a 
user and the dashed lines represent local influences). 
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Figure 4  Convergence behavior of the proposed bio-inspired CCM.  
unit rate. In(an,aJn)={mCn:am=an} represents a user set 
that belongs to the local community Cn and also chooses 
action an. Thus, the expected received payoff for each user 
is given by Rn=1/|In(an,aJn)|, where |·| represents the cardi-
nality of a set. 
The convergence behavior of the bio-inspired CCM is 
shown in Figure 4. Social optimum is obtained using an 
exhaustive search in a centralized manner. On the other 
hand, SAP is applied for the bio-inspired CCM. As the up-
dating user in each iteration is selected autonomously and 
randomly, the global iteration number is unobservable by 
the users. In the simulation study, the learning parameter for 
each user is set to  = 1+0.225k, where k is the index num-
ber that the user has selected to update its action. Note that 
learning parameter  is determined distributively and is user- 
dependent. In addition, it is noted from the figure that the 
bio-inspired CCM catches up with social optimum in ap-
proximately 45 iterations. This result validates the optimal-
ity of the proposed bio-inspired CCM. 
In addition, we also simulated the performance of an in-
dividual interested model, where each user maximizes its 
individual payoff Rnan(an,aJn) as specified by (2). As SAP is 
only suitable for potential games and the individual inter-
ested model is no longer a potential game, another well- 
known learning algorithm, no-regret learning [20], is ap-
plied for the individual interested model. For comparison 
fairness, the no-regret learning also starts from the same 
initial channel selection profile as that used in bio-inspired 
CCM. It is also noted in Figure 4 that the individual inter-
ested model converges to a local maxima of social welfare, 
i.e., it suffers from the tragedy of commons [8], as do most 
traditional game models. 
4  Discussion and future work 
The results presented in this paper are very general because 
we do not specify any network topology nor any form of 
spatial resource sharing function. Thus, the results can be 
applied to various scenarios where the autonomous users are 
spatially located and mutual influence only emerges be-
tween neighboring users. This is a promising approach that 
could be used to obtain optimal design in opportunistic 
spectrum access for cognitive radio ad hoc networks [3,23] 
and distributed spectrum management for wireless region 
area network [24]. 
As the proposed bio-inspired CCM is newly established, 
there still remain some problems that require further atten-
tion. Specifically, the following challenges should be con-
sidered in future work. 
(1) The impact of random communication link failure, 
which is caused by deep channel fading or moving objects 
between neighboring users, requires consideration. In this 
scenario, the convergence and optimality of the SAP in the 
presence of random link failure needs to be re-investigated. 
(2) Further investigation is required into asymmetric in-
fluence and communication between users. In some practi-
cal systems, mutually influenced users may be not able to 
exchange information directly. An example is a wireless 
local area network, in which the interference range is gener-
ally larger than the communication range. 
(3) New learning algorithms should be developed. Alt-
hough there is no need to collect information at a central 
point, an information exchange is still required in the local 
community. For some resource-limited networks, frequent 
information exchange may lead to unsustainable overheads. 
Thus, new learning algorithms, which require less infor-
mation exchange or can converge rapidly, are more prefera-
ble. Specifically, an algorithm that requires no information 
about other users is desirable. 
(4) The motivation behind the cooperation of the users 
must be considered. We have assumed that all the users are 
willing to help their connected users in this paper. However, 
this may be not true in practice. Specifically, let us suppose 
that a user behaves selfishly while all other users behave 
altruistically. In this scenario, the selfish user may receive a 
higher payoff than those behaving altruistically. Therefore, 
to ensure that the bio-CCM is robust, it is desirable that the 
mechanism also motivates the users to cooperate. 
5  Conclusion 
In this paper we considered social welfare maximization for 
spatial resource sharing networks (SRSNs), in which multi-
ple autonomous users are spatially located and mutual in-
fluence only emerges between neighbors. Inspired by local 
cooperation behaviors in biological systems, a community 
cooperative mechanism was proposed. It is analytically 
shown that with the proposed mechanism, the social opti-
mum of SRSNs is achieved with local information exchange. 
The results presented in this paper provide a better under-
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standing for distributed decision-making problems and can 
be applied to several communication systems. Future work 
focusing on more practical system models is ongoing. 
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